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and Some Comparisons
The German Civil Code of 19001 (Birgerliches Gesetzbuch-BGB)
offers many surprises to an American first undertaking its study. Certainly
one of its most novel features is the ease with which contracts may be
avoided on the grounds of unilateral mistake. The contrasting, traditional
common-law position was perhaps best summarized by Learned Hand in
Hotchkiss v. National City Bank:2
If, however, it were proved by twenty Bishops that either party, when he
used the words, intended something else than the usual meaning which the
law imposes on them, he would still be held, unless there were mutual
mistake, or something else of the sort.
The area of unilateral mistake is an illustration of how German and
American law approach a common solution from opposite directions. The
BGB limits considerably the possibilities of avoiding obligations because of
unilateral mistake which were available under the Roman common law3 in
force as a subsidiary law in about one-third of Germany immediately
before the adoption of the BGB, and earlier as a subsidiary law for the
entire country. On the other hand, some Americdn courts are breaking with
the traditional common-law viewpoint and are taking a less strict stance
toward the unilateral mistake. 4
If the law is a reflection of society's practical needs, these changes
indicate either that those needs have changed, or that they are being
*Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. B.S., Univ. of
Cincinnati, 1948, LL.B., Harvard, 1953; J.U.D., Umv. of Heidelberg, 1966; appointed
Professor of Law, Cumberland Law School, Samford University, Effective Sept. 1, 197 1.
'For a description of the code see Riegert, The West German Civil Code, Its Origin and
Its Contract Provision, 45 TUL. L. REV. 49 (1970). This article is an expansion of the section
on unilateral mistake published there.
2200 F. 287, 293 (S.D. N.Y. 1911).
3To take an example of Jhering's, a buyer who inadvertently ordered 100 pounds when
he intended to order only ten, could reject the excess without even being liable for the costs of
transportation. Kessler and Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith and
Freedom of Contract, A Comparative Study, 77 HARV. L. REV. 401, 402 (1964).4See text at footnotes 36- 39 infra.
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identified more clearly. Here the latter alternative seems the more prob-
able. As society's needs and goals become more sharply defined, changes
in hard-core doctrine additional to those which have already been made,
are likely to follow in the area of unilateral mistake and other crucial
contract areas in both legal systems.
5
The basic component of German contract law is the "juridical act" or
"declaration of will." While this term is not defined in the BGB, it is clear
that it is any act done with the intent to achieve legal consequences.6 Thus,
the term includes the common-law concepts of offer and acceptance, yet
goes far beyond the field of contract law. A declaration of will is any act
intended to create, terminate or change a legal relationship. 7 For example,
the manifestation of intent to terminate a contract, to make a gift, or to
adopt a child, are all declarations of will. While this discussion concen-
trates on the law of contracts, it must be kept in mind that the provisions of
the BGB relating to unilateral mistake in "declaration of will" are also
applicable to virtually all other areas of the law.
Section 119 of the BGB provides:
(1) A person who, when making a declaration of intention, was under a
mistake as to its purport, or did not intend to make a declaration of that
purport at all, may avoid the declaration if it is to be supposed that he would
not have made it with knowledge of the state of affairs, and with under-
standing appreciation of the case.
(2) A mistake concerning any characteristics of the person or thing that are
regarded in ordinary dealings as essential, is also deemed to be a mistake
concerning the purport of the declaration.
The Executory Contract
After the person entitled to avoid the declaration of will discovers his
mistake, he must make a timely and reasonable effort to notify the other
party of his election to avoid the declaration,8 or he loses the right.
5 For example, in the area of consideration or fault in contracting. See Riegert, supra,
note I, at 81-85 and 94-97.
6The term juridicial act (Rechtsgeschiift) is sometimes used in a somewhat different
sense to describe only an entire legal transaction. It is used in this article, as in much of the
German legal literature, as describing also a single "declaration of will" whether sufficient to
amount to a legal transaction or not.
7Juridicial acts were thus defined in section 88 of the Saxon Code of 1863: "If the
intention of an act is, in accordance with the law, to create, to terminate, or to change a legal
relationship, the act is a juridicial act." The explanations (motive) to the first draft of the BGB
said that the terms "juridicial act" and "declaration of will" were usually used synonymously.
Nussbaum, Die Rechtstatsachenforschung 130 (M. Rhebinder ed. 1968).
8Section 121: The avoidance must be made, in the cases provided for by Articles 119
and 120, without culpable delay (i.e., promptly), after the person entitled to avoid has obtained
knowledge of the grounds for avoidance. An avoidance as against a person who is not present
is deemed to have been effected in due time if the avoidance has been forwarded without
delay.
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Ordinarily, no special form of notice is required, but the intent to avoid
must be expressed clearly. Such notice becomes effective upon receipt by
the other party.9
Section 122 of the BGB is the crucial provision which allows the
German economy to operate without difficulty under such a lenient provi-
sion for the avoidance of obligations. It provides that the avoiding party
must compensate the other party-but only for those losses incurred in
reliance on the contract. This is different from an action on the contract,
because there is no cause of action for "lost profits" or other speculative
damages. The extent of reliance damages can never exceed the positive
interest; that is, the plaintiff is never entitled to compensation which is
greater than the damages to which he would be entitled if he were per-
mitted to sue on the contract. 10 If the obligee knew of the voiding party's
mistake,' or if he caused the mistake' 2 -even innocently-section 122
does not apply, and no damages or compensation whatsoever can be had.
The BGB does not permit avoidance for all unilateral mistakes, but only
for three types which are listed in section 119. The first class, mistake in
the purport of the declaration, consists typically of slips of the tongue or
pen, often of a clerical or typographical nature. The second class consists
of errors in content- the declarant intended to say or write the words he
used, but did not intend the content of his declaration, perhaps because he
did not understand the meaning of words he used. An example is the case
of a person who sells his restaurant, using the word, "Einrichtung" in the
bona fide belief that it includes only the fixtures, when in fact the term also
includes the furniture. He is entitled to avoid his declaration, because he
did not intend its content. The words he used did not correspond to the
mental picture he had of the deal he thought he was making. Cases in
which a contract is concluded with the wrong Schmidt, or the wrong object
is bought or sold, usually belong to this class, or to the first class. These
two classes of mistake, which are both covered by subsection (1) of
section 119, are so closely related that there is often some question as to
which one of them covers a particular fact situation.
The third class, which is dealt with separately in subsection (2) of
section 119, involves mistakes about an essential characteristic of a person
or thing. To be covered under section 119, the characteristic must be
"considered important 3 in ordinary dealings." Important qualities of per-
9Sec. 130 BGB.
10Sec. 122(1) BGB.11Sec. 122(2) BGB.12Judgment of Feb. 25, 1913, 81 RGZ 395.
13 A more common translation of the statute uses the word "essential" instead of impor-
tant, but "important" is a more accurate translation of the German term "wesentlich."
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sons include age, sex, professional knowledge, and ability; important char-
acteristics of things include form, color and chemical structure, the gen-
uineness of a painting, or the zoning of a lot. Whether a characteristic is
"important" depends in each case on the type of transaction involved. In
credit transactions, a buyer's wealth and credit rating are important charac-
teristics; for cash sales, they are not.
While section 119 appears to be very broadly drawn, numerous unilater-
al mistakes are not covered by it, and their occurrence therefore does not
entitle the mistaken party to avoid the transaction. 14 Examples of mistakes
which do not entitle avoidance, are situations in which a person buys a car,
not realizing he is ineligible to obtain a driver's license; or a merchant
orders a particular product, not realizing that he already has an oversupply
on hand. These mistakes are said to be "mere" mistakes in motive, and
contracts so made may not be avoided because the Code does not provide
for avoidance in such cases.
The reasons why the drafters did not provide for avoidance in such
situations are apparent. An unscrupulous party could profess a mistake in
the inception of his contracts relating to something completely extraneous
to the subject matter of the contract whenever a better bargain appeared;
or, if an anticipated change in price or other circumstances in his favor
failed to materialize -thus leading to a breakdown of commercial transac-
tions. By confining avoidance to mistakes concerning a person or thing
directly involved in the contract, a small but important element of control
is given, especially in conjunction with the further provisions of section
119, that the declarant can only avoid the declaration, if it is to be sup-
posed that he would not have made it with knowledge of the state of affairs,
and with understanding appreciation of the case.
One common type of mistake which causes considerable practical as
well as theoretical difficulties, is a mistake made by the seller in computing
the sales price. The German Supreme Court has refused to consider
value-taken alone-as an "important quality" for which the contract may
be avoided under subsection (2) of section 119.15
The German Supreme Court has been ingenious in circumventing its
"4Related, but much less important sections of the BGB are sec. 116, which deals with
secret reservations, sec. 117, which deals with pretended transactions and sec. 118 which
deals with declarations not seriously intended, e.g., made in jest. The important sec. 123
permits avoidance for fraud or duress. The avoidance may be made any time within a year
after knowledge of the pertinent facts have been obtained (sec. 124) (instead of "without
culpable delay" as required by sec. 119), and there is, of course, no liability for reliance
damages under sec. 122.
'
5Larenz, Allgemeiner Teil des BUrgerlichen Rechts (1967) (hereinafter cited as Larenz
AT) sec. 26 11, 384-86.
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own rulings, however, in those cases in which justice has demanded it. In
one case involving the sale of silver bullion,' 6 the seller grossly understated
the sales price. Even though silver bullion is a commodity whose price is
fixed within narrow limits, and it was thus obvious that a "real" mistake
had been made, the lower courts felt bound to apply the hard-line rule, and
denied relief. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, finding an error in
the content of the declaration under section 119(1). The court said that
such an error existed if the erroneous price was based on calculations
which had been part of the contract negotiations, or were otherwise known
to the other party. The theory is that the party obviously intended a
declaration with a content different from that of the one he made.
The rule, as worked out by the court, would prevent abuse by granting
that relief only when the other party had reason or opportunity to know
that there had been an error in calculation.' 7 This rule appears to be a wise
one, in line with German legal thinking, as well as consonant with deci-
sions rendered in some of the less traditional American jurisdictions. The
almost universal criticism to which the rule has been subjected in the
German legal literature seems unjustified, because such criticism
over-emphasizes the literal wording of the Code, and pays too little atten-
tion to its underlying policy which is clearly ascertainable.
One would expect errors in transmission to be covered by section 119 as
a genus of typographical error. Section 119 is limited, however, to mistakes
made by the parties. Section 120 fills the gap by providing that a declara-
tion of intention which has been transmitted incorrectly by a third party
(e.g., a telegraph company) can be avoided under the same conditions as an
avoidance under section 119.18
Section 122 makes a party avoiding under section 120 liable for reliance
damages, just as would be the case for an avoidance under section 119. As
indicated above, avoidance under section 119 is available not only in a
consensual two-party transactions, such as contracts and gifts, but to all
declarations of will, many of which are entirely unilateral. A tenant who
has given his landlord notice of intent to terminate a lease, can avoid the
notice if it was made under a section- 119 mistake, but. he must compensate
the landlord for any expenses he may have had in reliance on the notice,
such as those he may have incurred in attempting to secure a new leasee.
'
6Judgment of Dec. 17, 1920, 101 RGZ 107.
17See LarenzAT, sec. 26 I1, 377-78; Staudinger/Coing sec. 119, pt. 53, (1 Ith ed. 1957)[hereinafter cited as Staudinger/Coing] and the literature cited.
'sSec. 120 provides: "A declaration of intention that has been incorrectly transmitted by
the person or institution employed for its transmission may be avoided under the same
conditions as a declaration of intention made under mistake can be avoided under Article
119."
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Only one class of transaction is specifically excepted from avoidance for
unilateral mistake: the declaration of will which results in marriage. 19 The
provisions of section 119 are technically applicable to all other transac-
tions. The party making the mistake has the incredibly long time of thirty
years in which to discover it,20 but after discovery he must give the other
party prompt notice of his election to avoid. The Austrian Civil Code,
which gives a right of avoidance for unilateral mistake similar to that given
by the BGB, qualifies it by providing that such avoidance may be had only
if the mistake is discovered "in time."''1 There are very few provisions in
the BGB, for example those relating to the acceptance or rejection for
avoidance. 22
German legal scholars and jurists often agree that the mistake involved
in a particular case falls within the broad limits allowed for avoidance, and
that relief should thereby be afforded the mistaken party; yet they often
argue sharply and extensively as to the class to which the mistake may be
said to belong. Such disputes are academic, because the legal result is the
same regardless of which of the three types of mistake has been made.
Nonetheless, the disputes sometimes serve a practical purpose, for they
throw light on other cases in which it is not clear whether the mistake will
fit into any of the three types. 23
The Performed Contract
Although the wording of section 119 makes no distinction between
contracts which are executory and those that have been performed, the
realities of life are often insistent in their demands that such a distinction
be drawn. The problems encountered in returning the parties to the status
quo ante contratu, when duties required by the contract have been fulfilled,
are obviously different and more complex from those which arise when the
contract is still executory. The German courts have found various means
to avoid declaring executed transactions void, perhaps the most important
of which is the abstraction principle.2 4
19Larenz AT, sec. 26 I, 391; sec. 29 EheGesetz.
20Sec. 121 BGB. This period may be limited by provisions dealing with special types of
obligations; e.g., by sec. 477 dealing with sales.21Austrian Civil Code, sec. 87 1. The section is a combination of sections 119 and 121 of
the BGB, and was added to the Austrian Code of 1811 in the revision of 1916.
22Larenz A T, sec. 26 11, 388, Sec. 1955 BGB in combination with sec. 1945(1) BGB.
23See Staudinger/Coing sec. 119, particularly pts. Id, 11-34c, 52-55. This area of ab-
straction is one in which the provisions of the BGB are covered over with a superstructure of
partially conflicting theory, and does justice to the reputation of German scholars for complex,
abstract scholarly disputes.
"The abstraction principle described here is something different from the abstract
structure of the Code as a whole. The abstraction principle is limited to separating per-
International Lawyer, Vol. 5, No. 2
318 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
The German abstraction principle divides a transaction like a sale into
two parts: the contract and the performance-just as American law does.
German law stresses the two declarations of will, first that which results in
the "meeting of the minds," and second and quite independently, that
which executes the agreement. Practically, the mistake which affects the
contract almost invariably also affects transfers made pursuant to it. But
the abstraction principle also separates the execution, for example the
transfer, from the motive which is responsible for it. Hence it is quite
possible-following the reasoning of the abstraction principle-that a court
will avoid a contract because of a 119 mistake, yet nonetheless hold intact
the transfer of goods based on that contract.
Although similar results may be reached in American law-for example
in the case of immoral contracts, the contract may be voidable, but a
transfer made under it no longer reversible-German scholars seem to
think that the abstraction principle is something peculiar to German law.
The result which the principle achieves certainly is not, although the
precise theoretical reasoning may be. Only when the agreement and trans-
fer are made simultaneously, as illustrated in the egg case below, do the
German courts allow both transactions to be avoided under section 119.
It is not clear what social purpose is served by holding the property
transfer to be void if it is made at the same time as the contract, but not
voidable if it were made a few hours later.25 The wording of section 119,
taken by itself, does not compel this result; nor does the language of
section 139 support it:
If part of a juristic act is void, the whole juristic act is void, unless it is to
be presumed that it would equally have been entered into if the void part had
been omitted.
The term "juristic act" is used in a broad sense here, to apply to an
formance of a contract from its underlying obligations and motives. The abstract structure of
the BGB refers to the fact that the BGB is written on a high level of abstraction. Some
German lawyers find that the abstract concepts and system of the BGB, on one side, and
reasoning based on social and economic values recognized by the law, on the other side, are
two completely different processes of reasoning, which may also lead to two completely
different results. Sporadic changes from one approach to the other, which have no rational
basis, appear so arbitrary that Larenz thinks they are likely to erode public confidence in the
legal system. See I Larenz, Schuldrecht vii (10th ed. 1970). Cf. also Coing, System, Ges-
chichte und Interesse in der Privatrechtswissenschaft, JZ 1951, 48 1. This dichotomy has the
added disadvantage that civil law jurists often must do double work, i.e., they must think their
problem through in terms of accommodating the interests explicitly or implicitly recognized by
their legal system as a whole, and then a second time in terms of the concepts and system of
their Codes. It is probably not an a priori necessity that the results of these two approaches
diverge, but the fact is that they do diverge substantially in many parts of the German civil
law.
2In Judgment of Feb. 19, 1904, 57 RGZ 95, the Supreme Court suggested that the
success of the attack might depend upon the intent of the parties. Presumably the parties
would intend for the transfer to be avoidable when it was socially desirable for it to be so.
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entire legal transaction rather than to a single declaration of will. Whether
an underlying contract and its execution are to be considered a single
transaction within the meaning of section 139 is a question which is hotly
debated. Many scholars contend that party "will" can combine them into a
single transaction. One has reason to suspect, however, that the technical
legal question is often decided with the aim of achieving a socially desirable
result.
An important early case in connection with a section- 119 mistake, in-
volved a buyer who ordered a carload of eggs from a distant seller.28 The
seller wrote the buyer that she was sending the eggs COD because she did
not know him. The buyer replied that he had never received eggs COD and
would only accept them against a twenty-day negotiable note as was his
custom with Italian eggs. The seller was finally persuaded to telegraph the
railroad to let the buyer have the eggs without advance payment. The next
day he went into bankruptcy. The seller immediately notified the trustee in
bankruptcy that she rescinded the transaction, and demanded return of her
eggs. In deciding the case, the Supreme Court was surprisingly frank in
revealing its purpose to reach a just result, rather than merely to interpret
the literal words of the statute.
It first examined various legal theories which might permit the seller to
recover her eggs or their value, and came to the conclusion that the seller's
only chance of success was to avoid the transfer, which the court then held
that the seller could do. It reached this result by first holding that the
ability of the buyer to pay (concerning which the seller was mistaken here)
was an "important quality of the person" within the meaning of section- 119
when a sale on credit was involved. It then proceeded to hold that when a
contract and a property transfer are both based on the same declaration of
will, and that declaration is defective under section 119, both the contract
and the transfer can be avoided. The court concluded that the seller was
the owner of the eggs and could recover them (in this case, the price for
which they had been sold) from the trustee.
Even if a transfer made on the basis of an avoided contract cannot be
avoided directly under section 119, it can usually be undone with the
assistance of sections 812-818, which deal with unjust enrichment. They
provide that when a person has received something from another without
"legal cause," 27 he is obligated to return it.28 The most significant limitation
However, this approach of the Court has been criticized and has been pushed into the
background.
26Judgment of Oct. 18, 1907, 66 RGZ 385.27
"Legal cause" is a somewhat unclear concept, much broader than common-law consid-
eration, which provides the courts with an important additional way of influencing the
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on an action for unjust enrichment is section 818(3) which provides that
the transferee is no longer obligated to return what he has received if he is
"no longer enriched." Larenz believes that an action under sections
812-818 is adequate, and that an action based on ownership of the property
as a result of avoidance under section 119 is not necessary, and should not
be allowed. 29
Sections 459ff. provide another method for limiting the effect of section
119(2) in avoiding the transfer of a thing so far as a mistake concerning "an
important characteristic" thereof is involved. These sections provide that
when there are defects in the thing purchased, the buyer can, under certain
circumstances, demand rescission. If a subjective view of "defect" is taken
(and the courts are sometimes willing to go a long way in taking such a
view),3 0 any deviation from the contractually agreed characteristics of the
thing purchased, which will at the same time often be a deviation from the
expectation of the buyer, may be a "defect." This means that sections 459
if, will be applicable to many section-I 19(2)-mistake cases involving an
"important characteristic of a thing."
The results which flow from sections 459 ff. are different from those
which flow from section 119. Under sections 459 ff., the buyer has a
shorter period within which to attack the transaction, and is not permitted
to attack it if his mistake was based on gross negligence. Since it was
probably not the intent of the drafters of the BGB to permit buyers to have
rights under section 119 which are expressly denied to them under sections
459 ff., the courts have long held that when a defect exists which makes
sections 459 ff. applicable, only the rights granted by these sections, and
not those granted by section 119, are available to the buyer.3 1
A class of sales cases which is not affected by sections 459 ff. is that in
which not the buyer, but the seller was mistaken about an "important
quality" of the thing sold. In one case, a woman sold two Chinese vases
she believed were made in the early 19th century for 390 RM. 32 The vases
turned out to be from the Ming Dynasty. The original purchaser sold them
in Holland for more than 15,000 RM; they were allegedly finally sold to
the Kensington Museum in London for 200,000 RM. After notice of a
section- 119 avoidance had been given to the original purchaser, an assign-
ee of the seller brought an action against him for unjust enrichment. The
substantive law. See Ehmann, Ober den Begriff des rechtlichen Grundes im Sinne des sec.
812 BGB, 1969 NEUE JURISTICHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 398.28Staudinger/Coing pt. 35 before sec. 104.29Larenz A T sec. 26 II, 390.
30Staudinger/Coing sec. 119, Pt. 33.
31See Staudinger/Coing sec. 119, pts. 32-34c; Larenz AT sec. 26 II, 392f.
a
2Judgment of Feb. 22, 1929, 124 RGZ 115.
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assignee sued for the amount of his assignment, namely 5,000 RM.33 The
Supreme Court reversed the lower court's finding that there had been
culpable delay in giving notice of avoidance, and ordered the lower court to
find for the plaintiff if it found that she had, as alleged, been in error as to
the origin of the vases and would not have made the contract if she had
known the facts.
Although there are no statutory provisions limiting the application of
section 119 to labor contracts the demands of real life will not permit its
application ex tunc once performance has begun. The courts have worked
out a rule which generally amounts to permitting a termination of the labor
contract by the person entitled to avoid it under section 119. There is
dispute as to whether the section-i 19 right is always sufficient to permit
termination of the labor contract without notice, or whether changed cir-
cumstances can render termination without notice inappropriate.3 4
In the same way that real life will not permit ex tunc avoidance of
performed or partially performed labor contracts, it will not permit ex tunc
avoidance of contracts to participate in business associations, once the
association has been registered in the commercial register, or has com-
menced business. The result which the German courts attach to the avoid-
ance of such contracts with corporations, usually amounts to nothing more
than a standard winding up of the corporation under section 133 of the
German Commercial Code. In the case of partnerships, the result is usual-
ly a termination of the partnership ex nunc.3 5
Similarly, the courts have limited the right to avoid other executed
transactions, such as negotiable instruments which have been put into
circulation. This type of limitation has also taken place in many cases in
which the underlying contract was defective, not because of mistake, but
for some other reason, for example, because of fraud,3 6 or as being immor-
al.
It seems clear that for contracts which have been performed, the easy
avoidance provided in section 119 would often run counter to the need for
security in transactions, and that the problem is greater for some types of
contracts than for others. The way in which the German courts and writers
have gone about limiting the application of section 119 in the case of
contracts which have been performed, is illuminative of the process of legal
development in a code system.
"In German law, it is usually possible to split one's cause of action, and this is
sometimes done to reduce costs, which depend on the amount in controversy.3 4Larenz AT sec. 26 11, 390- 91.3 5LarenzA Tsec. 26 I1, 391-92 and the numerous cases cited there.
381d. at 390-91.
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Concluding Remarks
The German approach to the problem of unilateral mistake differs from
the American approach in at least three important ways: (1) An American
who enters into a contract by virute of a unilateral mistake can, in most
cases, free himself from the contract only by breaching it. His German
counterpart, on the other hand, enjoys a broad statutory right to avoid the
contract. (2) The German who is able to avoid a contract because of a
unilateral mistake must compensate the other party for his reliance dam-
ages. There is no such established doctrine in American law, which tends
much more to an all-or-nothing philosophy than the German law does.3 7 (3)
In the rare cases in which unilateral mistake would entitle an American to
modify his contractual obligations, he must effect this by application to the
courts for rescision or reformation under their equity powers. A German
can exercise his right to avoidance merely by timely notification to the
other party. No resort to the judiciary is necessary, although a party may
litigate the matter if he questions the sufficiency of the mistake to avoid the
contract.
American jurists, who stress the need for security of transactions, might
expect the German courts to have whittled down the rule of section 119,
but at least so far as executory contracts are concerned, it is clear that the
rule is enforced very much as it is written. Indeed, the American law seems
to be moving in the direction of the German rule. Perhaps the following
paragraph from Corbin presents a fair summary of the American law:
The American Law Institute states the law to be that a contract is not
made voidable by a unilateral mistake, however material it may be to the
interest of the mistaken party .... 3s Without doubt, this has been the
prevailing form of the statement, along with the even more common form that
mistake is not operative unless it is mutual. It is supported by some decisions
and many dicta; but the decisions which are inconsistent with it are too
numerous and too appealing to the sense of justice to be disregarded. . .. 39
A leading example of the more liberal view is City of Baltimore v. De
3 7The core of this principle of the German law is found in sec. 254, which is the basis of
the German comparative negligence rule, but is also equally effective in dividing losses in the
case of contracts. Sec. 254 and secs. 119 and 122 are similar, in that they seek an intermediate
rather than an all-or-nothing solution. Sec. 254 reads as follows: If any fault of the injured
party has contributed to causing the injury, the obligation to compensate the injured party, and
the extent of the compensation to be made, depend upon the circumstances, especially upon
how far the injury has been caused chiefly by the one or the other.
This applies also, even if the fault of the injured party consisted only in an omission to call
the attention of the obligor to the danger of an unusually serious injury, of which the obligor
neither knew or ought to have known, or in an omission to avert or mitigate the injury. ...38Restatement, Contracts, sec. 503 (1932). (Footnote by Corbin).
39A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, Vol. 3 sec. 608 (1960). (Footnotes partially
omitted.) Corbin favors a more liberal policy in granting relief from unilateral mistakes in
some circumstances. See the remainder of sec. 608.
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Luca-Davis Construction Co.,40 in which the court, after an extensive
study and review of the cases and the literature,, permitted a contractor
who had made a clerical error of almost $600,000 to rescind his bid and
recover a $50,000 deposit although a city-charter provision provided that
all bids became final when filed. But Judge Friendly's decision in United
States v. Wegematic Corp.41 permitting the United States to make what
amounted to a profit of $179,450 at Wegematic's expense, because Wege-
matic made a unilateral mistake regarding its ability to construct a complex
computer in a simplified way, signifies that the American law of unilateral
mistake is still quite different from the German law.
An important factor, not always expressly considered in American or
German cases, is whether the other party either knew, or under the circum-
stances should have known of the mistake. The question may be technical-
ly irrelevant, but the courts seem often to give it clandestinely the impor-
tance which it ought to receive openly. It may well be the key to a
reconciliation of the De Luca and Wegematic cases. It may also be the
basis of German decisions like the Silver case supra, which are not clearly
covered by the liberal German Code provision, but are situations in which
one party knows the basis of the other party's calculations, and presumably
also of his error.
The ease with which one can escape from executory contracts in Ger-
man law tends, on the one hand, to make contracts less useful because they
are less reliable. On the other hand, it tends to make them more useful
because they are less dangerous; they tend to be more an instrument for
fair exchange, and less an instrument for exploiting the unwary. Although
an exhaustive study of the functioning of the rule has not been made, the
rule seems to have worked well these seventy-one years. There does not
appear to have been an excessive number of contracts avoided under it,
and there has not been, and is not now, a movement to change the rule.
Although there is more diversity among civil-law countries than is general-
ly thought by common-law lawyers, the Austrian, the French and the Swiss
Civil Codes are uniform in that they are more generous than the common
law in allowing relief for unilateral mistake. 4
2
40210 Md. 518, 124 A.2d 557 (1956).
41360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966).
42Secs. 871-73, Austrian Civil Code; sec. 1109-10, French Civil Code; secs. 18, 23-27,
31, Swiss Civil Code. See generally Holstein, Vices of Consent in the Law of Contracts, 13
TUL. L. REV. 362 (1939); Sabbath, Effects of Mistake in Contracts, 13 INT'L & COMp. L. Q.
798 (1964); and 2 Zweigert and Kotz, Einfuhrung in die Rechtsvergleichung aufdem Gebiet
des Privatrechts, 96-100; 102-109.
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